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ABSTRACT
In many situations, people are unsure in their moral judgments. In much recent
philosophical literature, this kind of moral doubt has been analysed in terms of
uncertainty in one’s moral beliefs. Non-cognitivists, however, argue that moral
judgments express a kind of conative attitude, more akin to a desire than a belief.
This paper presents a scientifically informed reconciliation of non-cognitivism and
moral doubt. The central claim is that attitudinal ambivalence—the degree to
which one holds conflicting attitudes towards the same object—can play the role
of moral doubt for non-cognitivists. I will demonstrate that ambivalence has all of
the features that we would expect it to have in order to play the role of moral
doubt. It is gradable, can vary through time, covaries with strength of motivation,
and is suitably distinct from the other features of our moral judgments. As well as
providing a defence of non-cognitivism, this insight poses a new challenge for the
view—deciding how to act under moral ambivalence.
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1. Introduction
If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect us painfully, has any point of resemblance
with another thing which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we
shall hate the first-named thing, and at the same time we shall love it. […] This disposition of
the mind, which arises from two contrary emotions, is called vacillation; it stands to the
emotions in the same relation as doubt does to the imagination.
[Spinoza 1667: E3, p17]
It has been argued that non-cognitive attitudes have insufficient internal structure to
accommodate the features that common sense tells us are part of moral judgments.
Whereas moral judgments vary in certitude, importance, and robustness, non-cogni-
tive attitudes only possess two structural features—strength and stability over time.
Therefore, moral judgments cannot be non-cognitive attitudes [Smith 2002].
Could the ‘vacillation’ described by Spinoza reveal a feature of non-cognitive atti-
tudes that is overlooked by this critique? In this paper, I will argue that such internal
conflict, or ambivalence, can play the role of moral doubt that is missing from conven-
tional non-cognitivist accounts of moral judgments.
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In addition to providing a defence of non-cognitivism, reinterpreting the phenom-
enon of moral doubt in terms of attitudinal ambivalence provides an alternative per-
spective to the recent literature on moral uncertainty. Ambivalence, as a fundamentally
different state to uncertain belief, requires a fundamentally different response.
Section 2 will present the problem, retracing Michael Smith’s argument that non-
cognitivism cannot accommodate all three structural features of moral judgments.
Section 3 will introduce and characterise the notion of ambivalence. Section 4 will
demonstrate how ambivalence can play the role of certitude and thus provide a
defence of non-cognitivism, while Section 5 will anticipate and respond to some poten-
tial objections to this defence.
2. The Problem: Non-Cognitivism and Moral Uncertainty
What should we do when we do not know what we should do? There is a growing
philosophical literature built on attempts to answer this question and others like it.
A number of philosophers have argued for various norms that we should follow
when uncertain about moral facts [Lockhart 2000; Ross 2006; Sepielli 2009, 2012;
Gustafsson and Torpman 2014; MacAskill and Ord 2020]. Others have argued that no
such subjective norms exist, that what we should do is in fact what the true moral
theory says we should do, regardless of our beliefs [Weatherson 2014; Harman 2015].
The use of terms such as ‘facts’, ‘belief’, and ‘true’ appear to betray an underlying
presupposition in favour of metaethical realism. Indeed, debates on the topic of
moral uncertainty and the very question that defines it seem to depend on assumptions
about the nature of morality that are by no means uncontroversial. Non-cognitivists,
for example, would deny that any of these three terms accurately describe moral judg-
ments. This is a form of moral anti-realism; its proponents deny the existence of objec-
tive moral facts. Rather than asserting that all moral beliefs are mistaken, however,
non-cognitivists state that moral judgments are not beliefs at all and cannot be true
or false. Moral judgments, according to the non-cognitivist, are some variety of cona-
tive attitude, more akin to desire than to belief.
Thus, non-cognitivism can be characterised as comprising three central claims:
(1) Moral antirealism. There are no objective moral facts.
(2) Psychological non-cognitivism.
(i) Moral judgments are not beliefs.
(ii) Moral judgments are some variety of conative attitude.
(3) Semantic non-factualism. Moral sentences are not truth-apt; they take no
truth values.
This conception of non-cognitivism might be contested by quasi-realists, such as
Simon Blackburn [1984, 1993] and Allan Gibbard [2003], who adopt a minimalist
theory of truth to claim that terms like ‘fact’, ‘belief’, and ‘true’ can be applied to
moral judgments, even though they are not representational. Indeed, there has been
extensive debate in this journal about whether quasi-realism is equipped to make
sense of self-doubt and moral fallibility [Egan 2007; Blackburn 2009; Köhler 2015;
Beddor 2020; Lam 2020]. However, I will set these accounts aside for now, and will
focus on non-cognitivism as characterised above, since quasi-realism is sufficiently dis-
tinctive to require its own separate analysis.
2 NICHOLAS MAKINS
Because uncertainty is a measure of degrees of belief and non-cognitivism holds
that moral statements are not beliefs, discussion of moral uncertainty per se presup-
poses that non-cognitivism is false. However, might not this phenomenon be re-
described in a way that is consistent with non-cognitivism? Is there some gradable
feature of non-cognitive attitudes that can stand in for moral uncertainty for those
who deny that moral statements express beliefs? Michael Smith [2002] has argued
that there is not.
Smith argues that moral judgments have three structural features. The first is certi-
tude. This is the degree of confidence one has in a judgment. For example, I feel more
confident that it would be right to save a drowning child than that I should donate
most of my wealth to overseas development charities. This is the feature that has
gained much recent attention under the banner of normative or moral uncertainty.
I shall refer to the phenomenon of low moral certitude as moral doubt.
The second feature is importance. This is a measure of how desirable or undesirable,
good or bad, right or wrong, one judges something to be. Importance is distinct from
certitude. For example, I am equally confident that lying is wrong and that torturing an
innocent person is wrong, but I judge torture to be much worse than lying. These two
judgments are equal in certitude, but they differ in importance.
Lastly, we have robustness. This is the stability of moral judgments over time, as an
individual reflects and receives new information. Whereas certitude and importance
are synchronic, robustness is diachronic: it is a measure of change through time.
While Spinoza’s use (above) of the term ‘vacillation’ refers to what I will call ‘ambiva-
lence’, modern usage of the termmight be thought to refer to a lack of robustness. Note
that Smith defines robustness as the temporal stability of certitude only, but there may
also be changes in importance over time. For example, as I learn about the various suc-
cesses of non-violent protests in history and I reflect on current political injustices, I
might judge political activism as more important than I did previously, while also
feeling more confident in this judgment.
Any acceptable account of the nature of moral judgments must adequately capture
certitude, importance, and robustness. The central claim in Smith’s argument is that
cognitivist metaethical theories can accommodate these three features, but that non-
cognitivism cannot. This point can be made clear by comparing the archetypal cogni-
tivist and non-cognitivist interpretations of a typical moral judgment.
Suppose that an individual X makes the moral judgment that an action φ is morally
right. The cognitivist will interpret this as ‘X believes that φ is right.’ This judgment is
the belief that φ has the property of rightness. There are two features that can vary
independently—the degree of belief and the degree of rightness. The former captures
the certitude of X’s judgment; the latter captures its importance. The stability of these
features through time gives the judgment’s robustness. Thus, a cognitivist interpret-
ation of moral judgments captures all three structural features.
The non-cognitivist interpretation, on the other hand, is something like ‘X desires
that φ.’ For simplicity, we will proceed with desire as the non-cognitive attitude in
question, but note that there are numerous varieties of non-cognitivism and that
this discussion applies to non-cognitivism, broadly construed. Desire could be
replaced with a range of alternative non-cognitive attitudes and the analysis herein
should remain intact.
Rather than a property of φ and a belief about this property, on this interpretation
there is only one variable component—a desire. Therefore, this desire alone will have
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to capture the certitude, importance, and robustness of X’s judgment. However, as
Smith points out, it seems that desires have only two gradable features—strength
and the stability through time. The latter clearly represents robustness, but the strength
of a desire cannot be equivalent to both the certitude and the importance of a moral
judgment. For example, if my judgment, ‘telling the truth is good’, is simply a desire
for truth-telling, I might desire this more or less strongly. But common sense tells
us that there is a meaningful difference between a confident judgment that telling
the truth is slightly good and a less confident judgment that telling the truth is extre-
mely good. By varying only in strength, desires alone cannot capture this difference. In
summary, the argument goes as follows:
P1 Moral judgments have three structural features.
P2 Non-cognitive attitudes have only two structural features.
C Moral judgments are not non-cognitive attitudes.
Note that a committed non-cognitivist might well perform a Moorean shift, invert-
ing this argument to deny that moral judgments vary in both importance and cer-
titude. If we take the strength of a non-cognitive attitude to capture the importance
of a moral judgment, then the asymmetry between desire-like attitudes and moral
judgments appears to show that we cannot have both non-cognitivism and moral
doubt.
There have been a number of attempts to defend the compatibility of non-cogniti-
vism and moral doubt in response to this argument. James Lenman [2003] and
Michael Ridge [2003, 2006] have proposed modified versions of non-cognitivism,
introducing a belief component to moral judgments in addition to the desire-like atti-
tude. This is belief about the desires of some suitably idealised advisor. They therefore
accept Smith’s conclusion that non-cognitive attitudes alone cannot capture moral
doubt, but instead add beliefs into the mixture to do the job. More recently,
Andrew Sepielli [2012] and Julia Staffel [2019] have attempted to show that moral
doubt can be accommodated without invoking cognitivist attitudes, by building
uponMark Schroeder’s [2008a, 2008b] ‘being for’ version of non-cognitivism. Accord-
ing to this account, moral judgments involve two non-cognitive attitudes—a conven-
tional non-cognitive attitude, such as blame or praise, and a second attitude, being for,
which is directed at the first attitude. By introducing two non-cognitive attitudes,
rather than one, this account provides the structure to accommodate both importance
and certitude.
These attempts to rescue non-cognitivism share a basic strategy: they accept that
Smith’s argument undermines extant non-cognitivist theories, and proceed to
modify those theories with extra components, be these beliefs or further non-cognitive
attitudes, to accommodate certitude. All of these proposals face problems of their own,
but here I want to take a different tack.1 Drawing on evidence from social psychology, I
will show that P2 of the above argument is false, and that even the most unsophisti-
cated non-cognitive attitudes have sufficient structure to accommodate robustness,
importance, and certitude. The missing ingredient was, all along, a feature of atti-
tudes—namely, ambivalence.
1 See Bykvist and Olson [2011, 2017] and Eriksson and Olinder [2016] for more on these problems.
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3. The Solution: Ambivalence
Leontius the son of Aglaeon was coming up from the Piraeus, outside the North Wall but close to
it, when he saw some corpses with the public executioner standing near by. On the one hand, he
experienced the desire to see them, but at the same time he felt disgust and averted his gaze. For a
while he struggled and kept his hands over his eyes, but finally he was overcome by desire; he
opened his eyes wide, ran up to the corpses, and said, ‘There you are, you wretches! What a
lovely sight! I hope you feel satisfied!’
[Plato, Republic: 439e–440a]
Leontius faces a problem in deciding how to act: he concurrently wants to see the
corpses and to avert his gaze. He has conflicting desires, which cause doubt and hesita-
tion. In the end, he gives in to his morbid fascination and he looks, but it is his state of
mind before this moment that is of interest here.
Recall P2 of Smith’s argument: non-cognitive attitudes have only two structural fea-
tures. These are the strength of an attitude and its stability over time. Stability is dia-
chronic, so that at a single moment non-cognitive attitudes have only a single
structural feature: strength. How might the case of Leontius fit into this unidimen-
sional account of non-cognitive attitudes? His attitude towards seeing the corpses
appears to contain more complexity than merely its strength. This suggests that P2
is worthy of closer inspection.
To scrutinise an empirical claim about attitudes, such as P2, it seems appropriate to
turn to the discipline of social psychology, historically branded as the description and
explanation of attitudes [Thomas and Znaniecki 1918]. For much of the past century,
the scientific consensus seems to have been with Smith. In most psychological research,
attitudes were considered unidimensional and were standardly measured by the
semantic differential technique, with positive and negative valence represented as
opposite ends of the same scale. As Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin [1995: 363] note,
the very methods used to measure them ‘construe attitudes as falling on some point
along an evaluative dimension, assessed by such bipolar scales as: favourable-unfavor-
able, positive-negative, good-bad, or like-dislike.’ So, if the attitude in question was
desire and the object of this desire was a proposition p, we would have a strong
desire that p at one end, a strong desire that not-p at the other end, and indifference
somewhere in the middle.
However, in 1972, K.J. Kaplan proposed a modification to the semantic differential
technique. He claimed [1972] that the positive and negative components of attitudes
should be measured separately, rather than on a single bipolar scale. On this
method, the degree to which an individual desires that p would be measured on one
scale, from no desire that p to strong desire that p, and the degree to which they
desired that not-p would be measured separately. In many simple cases of desire,
this would yield the result that an individual has a desire that p and no desire that
not-p. In simple cases of indifference, this would yield the result that an individual
has no desire for either. However, from its earliest uses, this modified semantic differ-
ential technique also revealed what Plato had been indicating, more than two thousand
years earlier: individuals can evaluate something concurrently as both positive and
negative. They can both desire that p and desire that not-p. They can be ambivalent.
The early models of attitudes, varying along a single dimension, seem unable ade-
quately to represent Leontius’ desires with respect to seeing the corpses. It would be
misleading to suggest that he is somewhere in the middle, neither wanting to look
nor wanting not to look. In fact, the opposite is true: he holds both of these strong
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desires at once. There is a clear difference between a person like Leontius, who has a
strong desire to do something and a strong desire not to do that same thing, and a
person who has no strong feelings either way. If we represent desires as varying
along a single dimension, however, we cannot distinguish between these two states.
Kaplan’s proposed modification of the semantic differential technique was an
attempt to provide a conceptual and methodological distinction between indifference
and ambivalence in individuals’ attitudes. This attempt succeeded, and ambivalence
has proven, ever since, to be a rich vein of psychological research.
There are, of course, some pitfalls in this sort of cross-disciplinary approach,
because terms are not always taken to have the same meaning in different fields. For
instance, the indifference to which Kaplan refers—the absence of any strong feeling
either way—is different from the meaning of indifference within philosophy, where
decision theorists take it to mean that neither of two options is strictly preferred to
the other. In social psychology, one might be ambivalent, indifferent, or neither, but
not both. Decision-theoretic indifference, however, is entirely consistent with ambiva-
lence if the opposing attitudes lead one to have no strict preference for one option over
another. Similarly, attitudes are not conceived of in exactly the same way in philosophy
and psychology. Whereas an attitude in psychology is taken to be an evaluative apprai-
sal of an object of almost any kind, including social groups, policy positions, abstract
concepts, or physical objects, attitudes in philosophy are taken to be the relation that
an individual bears to a proposition, and need not involve any psychological element.
As noted by Frank Ramsey, ‘the beliefs which we hold most strongly are often
accompanied by practically no feeling at all; no one feels strongly about things he
takes for granted’ [1926: 65].
There is, however, an important lesson that can be learnt from the psychological
study of ambivalence, which is relevant for the philosophical analysis of attitudes—
namely, that agents can have a varying degree of internal conflict in their attitudes,
and that this affects the ways in which we think about and act on attitudes. We
simply require a definition of ambivalence that coheres with a philosophical under-
standing of the relevant concepts.
A desire provides an agent with at least pro tanto reason to act. My desire for ice
cream provides me with some reason to seek ice cream. Often, our desires give rise
to reasons that cannot all be satisfied. It is this presence of competing reasons that I
aim to capture with the label ‘ambivalence’. Reasons are competing if they support
mutually exclusive options or courses of action. This conception of ambivalence
does not require a commitment to any metaphysically loaded notion of objective nor-
mative reasons. The reasons at play here should be thought of as an agent’s particular,
contingent, motivating reasons [Raz 1975; Smith 1994; Parfit and Broome 1997]. These
need not be ‘good’ reasons; nor must they reflect any moral, prudential, or even
empirical truths beyond the simple fact that they motivate the agent in question.
Furthermore, reasons might apply not only to concrete courses of action, but also to
mental attitudes themselves. Indeed, in so far as we take ourselves to have reasons for
our desires, we might even be ambivalent with respect to which desires to have in the
first place. The same can be said of other propositional attitudes for which we have
reasons. An agent who has some reason to believe or desire that p, and some reason
not to believe or desire that p, should be considered ambivalent, even though these
mental attitudes are not conventionally considered options of choice. Thus, for any
two alternatives A and B, an agent is ambivalent iff
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(i) the agent has motivation reason for A,
(ii) the agent has motivating reason for B, and
(iii) if B then not-A.
If an agent is ambivalent in virtue of the reasons that are provided by their moral judg-
ments, then they may aptly be described as morally ambivalent. Ambivalence may be
due to conflict in desires, or due to conflicting reasons that arise from any other source.
Thus, ambivalence is relevant for a wide range of non-cognitivist views concerning
which attitudes comprise moral judgments. Of course, we might also be ambivalent
in our reasons for action that play no part in our moral psychology. Buridan’s ass is
clearly ambivalent, torn between reasons for two equally delicious piles of hay, even
though it makes no moral judgment about the conflicting options.
Perhaps there exist some attitudes, emotions, or desires that are in some sense con-
flicting, but that do not feature as reasons for agents. For example, the emotion of
regret regarding a one-off event in the past appears not to provide any particular
reason for an agent to do anything, but seems to conflict with feelings of satisfaction
or pride about the same event. Similarly, conflicting desires for things that are entirely
out of one’s hands, such as the desire for both sun and rain, might seem to manifest
ambivalence without providing reasons [Prinz 2004]. However, recall that we are con-
sidering a broad range of reasons, including those for the adoption of mental attitudes.
These emotions and desires might themselves provide competing reasons for adopting
further mental attitudes, thereby satisfying the criteria for ambivalence, so-defined. In
fact, I do not deny the possibility of some forms of internal conflict without competing
reasons. This possibility is simply not relevant to the present discussion. We are
looking for a feature of moral judgments that might contribute to our understanding
of the nature of moral doubt, and the presence of competing reasons might provide
just such a feature. This account of ambivalence might not encompass all varieties
of internal conflict, but mental states that do not provide reasons in the way that
moral judgments do are not relevant to understanding the phenomenon of moral
doubt.
The degree of an agent’s ambivalence is jointly determined by the balance and
weight of their reasons. An agent is ambivalent to the degree that their conflicting
reasons are strong and closely balanced. Thus, (1) the stronger the conflicting
reasons are, the greater the degree of ambivalence, and (2) the more closely balanced
the conflicting reasons are, the greater the degree of ambivalence. Thus, an agent might
be considered ambivalent when they have conflicting reasons, even if one set of reasons
decisively outweighs the others to settle a choice. This might appear to clash somewhat
with the everyday use of the term, which is normally reserved for cases in which
someone has mixed feelings that are at least approximately equal in strength.
However, the present definition is apt, since, even when one set of reasons decisively
outweighs the other, the outweighed reasons persist and are relevant to practical delib-
eration. When an agent is ambivalent, they cannot avoid taking an action against
which they have at least some reason, no matter what they choose. This might make
a choice difficult, require careful deliberation, and leave the nagging tug of residual
reasons, even if an agent acts in accordance with the most compelling reasons, all
things considered.
This is a fairly general conception of ambivalence, lacking the precision of the
various social-psychological methods for quantifying ambivalence from the strength
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and closeness of conflicting attitudes. For the purposes of this paper, however, it will
suffice to acknowledge that ambivalence exists as a result of the balance and weight of
conflicting reasons, without the need for an exact measure. Recognising that agents can
be ambivalent in their desires, along with a range of other attitudes, shows that P2 in
Smith’s argument is false. Non-cognitive attitudes vary not only in strength and
robustness, but also in degree of ambivalence. However, more is required in order
to reconcile moral doubt and non-cognitivism: ambivalence in non-cognitive attitudes
must be able to play the role of low certitude in moral judgments.
4. Playing the Role of Certitude
As in the case of Leontius, the presence of ambivalence might cause an agent to be
unsure of how to act, making it difficult to know what to do, and producing a form
of practical doubt that is distinct from partial belief. Ambivalence poses a challenge
when deciding what to do, not because of a lack of information, like uncertainty,
but because weighing competing reasons is difficult. In cases of moral ambivalence,
this leads to doubt about what moral statements to assert, how to appraise the
actions of others, and, ultimately, what choices we make as morally conscientious indi-
viduals. The more ambivalent an agent’s attitudes, the less confidence they might have
in their moral judgments. Just as uncertainty gives rise to moral doubt according to
cognitivism, ambivalence does so according to a non-cognitivist view.
Consider a classic case of what cognitivists would describe as moral uncertainty.
In his 1946 lecture ‘L’existentialisme est un humanisme’, Jean-Paul Sartre recounted
the story of a student of his who, during World War II, was struggling to choose
between leaving home to join the Free French Forces, or staying in France with
his mother. On the one hand, he yearned to fight the Nazis and avenge the death
of his brother. On the other, he felt duty-bound to care for his mother, who would
be devastated to be abandoned by her only surviving child. Sartre says that his
student ‘was hesitating between two kinds of morality. […] He had to choose
between those two’ [1946: 40].
A cognitivist interpretation of this case of moral doubt would explain it in terms of
the student’s partial degrees of belief about what he ought to do. He is uncertain about
which of two statements is true—that he should go to war, or that he should stay at
home with his mother. Conversely, non-cognitivists can explain this case in terms
of the student’s ambivalence. He faces difficulty in deciding what to do, because he
concurrently has reasons for going to war and for not going to war. Due to the circum-
stances in which he finds himself, his desire to care for his mother conflicts with his
desire to defend his country and avenge his brother. The experience of Sartre’s
student seems to capture the feature of certitude that Smith identifies. However,
ambivalence in non-cognitive attitudes seems equally well equipped to make sense
of the student’s state of mind as cognitivist degrees of belief. While a sense of filial
duty provides a compelling reason to stay, fraternal loyalty and patriotism provide
reasons not to do so. Explaining the difficulty of this decision and the hesitation of
the student does not require attribution of moral beliefs. If anything, ambivalence
seems to give a truer account of the student’s experience. He does not feel merely
uncertain, as one might about tomorrow’s weather. He feels torn. Conflicted.
Divided. The very language of moral dilemmas connotes ambivalence over
uncertainty.
8 NICHOLAS MAKINS
In addition to this example, a quick survey of the literature on moral uncertainty
reveals that many of the cases that these authors discuss could plausibly be redescribed
in terms of attitudinal ambivalence. They cite uncertainty about the truth of liberal
values or religious moral codes, or about the morality of abortion, trolley cases, and
eating meat [Gracely 1996; Lockhart 2000; Ross 2006; Sepielli 2010; MacAskill 2014;
Harman 2015]. Yet these examples might alternatively be characterised as involving
ambivalent non-cognitive attitudes. Moreover, the few cases that do seem unequivo-
cally to comprise degrees of belief rather than ambivalence involve implausible
moral psychology. In a recent paper by Will MacAskill and Toby Ord [2020], for
example, we are asked to consider the case of an agent who has a credence of 40%
in some form of non-consequentialism and 60% in hedonic utilitarianism: she is
uncertain as to which is the true moral theory. This certainly sounds like uncertainty
rather than ambivalence, but surely nobody (a handful of moral philosophers aside)
undertakes moral reflection in this way, considering each moral theory in turn and
assigning it a credence. At the very least, non-cognitivists might be able to set this
sort of case to one side as a problem particular to cognitivism. Some might find them-
selves in just such a quandary, but this is due to their mistaken understanding of the
nature of moral judgments, and it is no major loss to non-cognitivism if it cannot
accommodate these situations. It is the true-to-life moral dilemmas such as that of
Sartre’s student that we should be concerned to explain, and in these cases ambivalence
fares at least as well as uncertainty.
In order to serve as the missing link between non-cognitivism and moral uncer-
tainty, however, ambivalence must be able to play the role of certitude in moral judg-
ments. There are a number of desiderata that comprise this role. First and foremost,
ambivalence should be gradable. Moral certitude is not binary, but comes in varying
degrees as individuals feel more or less confident of their moral judgments. Likewise,
it seems clear that ambivalence comes in degrees. It is routinely quantified in the scien-
tific study of attitudes, and there a number of methods for its measurement. It also
seems intuitively right that agents can be ambivalent to a greater or lesser extent:
the stronger and more closely balanced their conflicting attitudes, the greater their
degree of ambivalence.
Second, ambivalence should be able to vary through time, to give a moral judg-
ment’s robustness. This feature of ambivalence follows straightforwardly from its grad-
ability. For example, if Leontius were to reflect on the fact that death is a natural part of
life, his feeling of disgust and desire not to look might diminish, thereby reducing his
ambivalence. As an agent’s reasons arise and fade away, and as the strengths of these
reasons wax and wane, there will be a consequent change in the degree to which that
agent is ambivalent.
Next, certitude is distinct from importance, and so ambivalence should be distinct
from strength. These features are not entirely orthogonal, since the strength of confl-
icting desires partly determines ambivalence. However, ambivalence does not merely
track strength and they are distinct variables. One might feel more ambivalent about
lying out of politeness than about murder, because the competing reasons for and
against the former are more closely balanced, even though the latter elicits stronger
reasons overall. In fact, an increase in the strength of reasons not to murder would
make one less ambivalent, not more so. Likewise, certitude and importance are dis-
tinct, but not completely orthogonal. Considerations that would increase importance
in the judgment that it would be wrong to lie, such as having taken an oath to tell the
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truth, or speaking to a friend who highly values honesty, also seem to confer additional
certitude in this judgment. Suppose, however, that one were to learn of additional con-
siderations both against and in favour of lying. Then we might expect the matter to be
considered one of greater importance but reduced certitude; or, as per the proposed
analysis, one of stronger non-cognitive attitude and greater degree of ambivalence.
Thus, although ambivalence and strength are not completely orthogonal, the relation-
ship between them appears to be just what we should expect for an account of certitude
and importance in moral judgments.
Smith describes how the strength of a rational agent’s motivation covaries with the
certitude of their moral judgments. Ambivalence should therefore bear this relation to
motivation in order to play the role of certitude. And indeed it seems to do so. If Leon-
tius had a desire to look at a beautiful sunset, equal in strength to his desire to look at
the corpses, and no conflicting desire not to do so, we would expect him to be more
motivated to look at the sunset than at the corpses. Moreover, there is strong scientific
evidence to support this relationship. Numerous studies have found that a higher
degree of ambivalence leads to a weaker attitude-behaviour relationship, with attitudes
less predictive of behaviour. Ambivalence weakens the link from attitudes to intentions
and from intentions to behaviour. This effect has been observed in a wide range of
behaviours, including diet [Armitage and Conner 2000; Berndsen and van der Pligt
2004], smoking [Lipkus et al. 2001], and recreational drug use [Conner et al. 2002;
Conner and Armitage 2008]. In summary, the greater the degree of ambivalence in
an individual’s attitude, the less likely they are to act on that attitude, just as should
be the case for an account of certitude.
It should now be clear that ambivalence has all of the features that we would expect
it to have in order to play the role of low certitude in our moral judgments. It is grad-
able; it can fluctuate through time; it is suitably distinct from importance; and it cov-
aries with motivation. So, the presence of moral doubt need not pose a problem for
non-cognitivism. I do not mean to claim that ambivalence is the only possible way
of understanding moral doubt. It can, after all, be interpreted by cognitivists as uncer-
tainty. But ambivalence at least provides an account that matches the true phenom-
enon of moral doubt and is consistent with non-cognitivism. We shall now consider
some potential objections to the claim that ambivalence can play the role of moral
doubt in non-cognitivist accounts of moral judgments.
5. Objections
5.1 Ambivalence and Uncertainty
One might accept that there is ambivalence in moral judgments, but claim that this is
in addition to, rather than instead of, moral certitude. The problem facing non-cogni-
tivism arose because non-cognitive attitudes have fewer structural dimensions than
moral beliefs do. If we introduce ambivalence, this gives a richer structure to non-cog-
nitive attitudes. But this move also produces an equivalent increase in the structural
complexity of moral beliefs, since they come with their own degree of ambivalence.2
Because ambivalence is not unique to non-cognitive attitudes, its introduction does
not close the gap between them and moral beliefs.
2 See Makinson [1965] and Klein [1985] for more on ambivalence in belief.
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While it is true that there might be ambivalence over and above uncertainty in
beliefs, this does not mean that moral judgments must also have both. The crux of
the problem was not that non-cognitive attitudes have less structure than beliefs,
but that they have less structure than moral judgments seem to have. In order for
this objection to have force, it must be shown that we should also separate uncertainty
and ambivalence in moral judgments. But it is a necessary feature of non-cognitivism
that there is no uncertainty per se, because moral judgments aren’t beliefs. Moral judg-
ments, being non-cognitive attitudes, are fundamentally different from beliefs. Why
should we expect them to have the same structure? What matters is that non-cognitive
attitudes can be shown to have the same structure as actual moral judgments. And, as
we have seen, they can. There is nothing missing from the non-cognitivist’s expla-
nation of realistic moral judgments, such as those regarding the dilemma facing
Sartre’s student.
5.2 Uncertainty about Desires
It may be objected that ambivalence is unnecessary for accommodating certitude,
because an agent might simply be uncertain about their desires. Bradley and Dreschler
[2014] suggest that the desirability of an outcome in a decision problem might depend
not only on features of that outcome itself, but also on those of the decision-maker,
such as their tastes, preferences, or needs. An agent might be just as uncertain about
their own desires as they are about the features of an outcome itself. Similarly,
Jerzak [2019] has suggested that agents might be uncertain or mistaken about their
own desires. Surely it is this uncertainty about our own desires that, for non-cogniti-
vists, should stand in for moral doubt.
There are two reasons for non-cognitivists not to analyse moral doubt in terms of an
agent’s beliefs about their desires. First, there seem to be examples in which agents
experience moral doubt despite being certain in their beliefs about their desires.
Sartre’s student is just such an example: he believes with certainty that he desires to
stay with his mother, and he believes with certainty that he desires to join the
French resistance, but he feels moral doubt nonetheless, because of the conflict
between these desires.
Second, an important idea underlying non-cognitivism is the Humean theory of
motivation, according to which motivation stems from a desire for some end and
from beliefs about how to realise it. Analysing moral doubt in terms of beliefs about
desires would suggest that we act on the basis of what we believe our desires to be,
rather than on the desires themselves. This is in tension with the Humeanism that
underpinned non-cognitivism in the first place, and so hardly provides a suitable
non-cognitivist account of moral uncertainty. A truly non-cognitivist theory of
metaethics needs an account of certitude without recourse to beliefs. Ambivalence
remains the only plausible candidate.
5.3 A Property of What—Desires or Agents?
One potentially troubling feature of the definition of ambivalence offered above is that
it describes a property of an agent, rather than of an attitude. Ambivalence is the state
of having attitudes that give rise to reasons for mutually exclusive options, but moral
certitude is a feature of an attitude itself. This is unlike the cognitivist conception of
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moral uncertainty in terms of degrees of belief, since this is a property of the belief
itself.
However, note that, in terms of both belief and non-cognitive attitudes, we talk
about properties of the attitude itself and of the agent who holds it. With beliefs, we
have a property of the attitude—degree of belief—and a property of the agent—uncer-
tainty. An agent is uncertain concerning p if they hold a partial belief in p. In other
words, if their credence in p is <1. Likewise, with non-cognitive attitudes we have a
property of the attitude—conflict with other attitudes—and a property of an agent—
ambivalence. An agent is ambivalent if they hold attitudes that give rise to reasons
for mutually exclusive options.
This also coheres with the feature of moral judgments that we are trying to under-
stand: there is a property of the judgment—certitude—and a property of the agent who
makes it—moral doubt. Thus, the fact that the discussion so far has focused on the
property of the agent, rather than of the attitude, should be no cause for concern. It
is just like talking about uncertainty, rather than partial degrees of belief, or like
talking about moral doubt, rather than the certitude of moral judgments.
However, a further problem might appear to linger. While the degree of a belief is
an intrinsic property of that belief, the consistency of a desire with other desires is a
relational property. It concerns the way in which one desire relates to the others
that an agent holds. Another disanalogy, another possible weakness in the proposal.
However, a disanalogy between ambivalence and uncertainty is not necessarily proble-
matic. Indeed, in so far as this paper is attempting to propose an alternative under-
standing of moral doubt, it would be entirely uninteresting if there were no
differences between the cognitivist and non-cognitivist conceptions of the phenom-
enon. As in response to the first objection considered, the question is not that of
whether moral ambivalence is exactly like cognitivist moral uncertainty; rather, the
question is that of whether moral ambivalence adequately matches the phenomenology
of moral doubt. It would be question-begging for a cognitivist to claim, without further
argument, that moral doubt must be explained in terms of an intrinsic property of
moral judgments, like degrees of belief.
The question, then, is whether we should think of moral certitude as a feature of
moral judgments’ relations to each other, or as an intrinsic property of each separate
judgment. The examples considered throughout this paper lend some support to the
view that moral doubt takes the form of conflict between different judgments, rather
than being an intrinsic property of each, but this support falls short of a knockdown
argument. It is worth noting, however, that it only seems to be uncertainty that
comes with a degree of ambivalence that poses a challenge when deciding how to
act. If we are uncertain about some matter of fact that will determine the outcome
of a choice between two options A and B, but option A is better than option B in all
possible states of the world, then this uncertainty is of little practical import.3 Uncer-
tainty is relevant to our practical deliberation when the different partial beliefs provide
reasons for mutually exclusive courses of action. For example, If I am uncertain about
whether it will rain, I might be unsure of whether to take an umbrella. Suppose that I
would prefer to take my umbrella if it does rain, and not if it doesn’t. I believe, to
3 This assumes that the states are probabilistically independent of the options. If such independence does not
hold, however, then the significance of the uncertainty also depends on the conflicting reasons that would arise
from the effect of the choice on the probability of the states, which is another type of ambivalence.
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degree x, that it will rain. This provides me with some reason to take my umbrella.
However, I also believe, to degree y, that it will not rain. This provides me with
some reason not to take my umbrella. Of course, I cannot both take my umbrella
and not take it, and so these conflicting reasons, which depend on my partial
beliefs, make me ambivalent. If I preferred to take my umbrella regardless of
whether it rained, my uncertainty about the rain would be irrelevant to the decision
of whether to take it, since it would be obvious that I should. Note that the ambivalence
here is not intrinsic to the belief, but is a relational property of my partial beliefs in light
of the reasons for action to which they give rise. If it is this relational property that
explains the practical significance of uncertainty, then there seems little reason to
think that a relational property is ill-equipped to make sense of the variations in
moral certitude.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I have presented one way of understanding the phenomenon of moral
doubt that is consistent with non-cognitivism. On this view, moral doubt is not uncer-
tainty in a person’s beliefs, but is ambivalence in their non-cognitive attitudes—that is,
the presence of conflicting reasons that arise from these attitudes and support mutually
exclusive options. The existence of ambivalence controverts the claim that non-cogni-
tive attitudes have only two structural features. This undermines a central premise in
the argument for the view that moral judgments cannot be non-cognitive attitudes due
to their structural differences. The principal upshot is that one can consistently be a
non-cognitivist and recognise variation in the certitude of moral judgments.
However, the differences between ambivalence and uncertainty also suggest a
different understanding of, and practical response to, the phenomenon of moral
doubt. This poses a new challenge: what should we do when ambivalent about what
to do? This is a challenge that must be met by cognitivists and non-cognitivists alike.4
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